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WRANGLING IN THE SHADOWS: THE USE
OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES IN
COVERT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE
WAR ON TERROR
Michael McAndrew*
Abstract: Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sept-
ember 11, 2001, the United States Senate granted the use of all necessary
and appropriate force to prevent any future acts of international terror-
ism against the country. As part of this campaign against global terrorism,
the United States Department of Defense sought an expanded role for
Special Forces soldiers in covert paramilitary operations, a tactical respon-
sibility traditionally within the domain of the CIA. In this Note, the
author analyzes the protocol for authorizing covert activity and the ramiª-
cations under international law of utilizing formal United States military
personnel to conduct such operations. The author suggests that non-
uniformed, deniable covert operations should remain with the CIA since
the loss of Geneva Convention status by United States Special Forces
personnel seems excessive in light of the legal means available for utilizing
them in the war on terror.
Introduction
In January, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld stated that “[t]he global na-
ture of the war [on terrorism], the nature of the enemy and the need
for fast, efªcient operations in hunting down and rooting out terrorist
networks around the world have all contributed to the need for an
expanded role for the special operations forces.”1 Rumsfeld made no
secret of his plans to thrust special forces into a greater role in the war
on terrorism by using them for covert operations around the globe.2
The justiªcation for this plan lies in the belief that twenty-ªrst century
threats necessitate the ability to deploy teams rapidly to suppress the
United States’s terrorist adversaries wherever they are located, how-
                                                                                                                     
* Michael McAndrew is an Executive Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
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1 William M. Arkin, Secret Soldiers; Will Our Military Be Dominated by Forces Shielded from
Scrutiny?, L.A. Times, June 22, 2003, at M1.
2 Jennifer D. Kibbe, The Rise of the Shadow Warriors, 83 Foreign Aff. 102, 102 (2004).
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ever distant.3 The Defense Department’s contention that our special
forces are uniquely equipped to manage this undertaking has placed
it at odds with the CIA, which traditionally has handled covert para-
military operations.4
This Note seeks to examine the international legal implications
of authorizing United States Special Operations Forces to conduct
covert paramilitary operations in the war on terror. Part I deªnes cov-
ert action and the protocol for its authorization and examines why
covert activity typically has fallen under the purview of the CIA. Part II
illustrates the ramiªcations under international law of utilizing formal
United States military personnel for covert operations. Part III argues
that non-uniformed, deniable covert operations should remain in the
domain of the CIA, and not the Special Operations Forces, since the
loss of Geneva Convention status by United States military personnel
seems excessive in light of the legal means available for conducting
the war on terror.
I. History and Background
The current deªnition of covert action, established under the
Intelligence Authorization Act for ªscal year 1991, is “an activity or
activities of the United States Government to inºuence political, eco-
nomic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the United States Government will not be apparent or ac-
knowledged publicly.”5 Covert actions therefore strive to maintain the
secrecy of those sponsoring them.6 Inherent in this goal is the plausi-
ble deniability of the act by the sponsoring party.7
Under Title 50, covert action is treated as distinct from tradi-
tional military activities.8 While the statutory language does not deªne
traditional military activities, the legislative history reveals an intent
that they encompass activities by military personnel under the direc-
tion and control of a United States military commander.9 The confer-
ence committee report explained that traditional military activities
are meant to include actions preceding and related to hostilities that
                                                                                                                     
3 See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transforming the Military, 81 Foreign Aff. 20, 27 (2002).
4 See Linda Robinson, Walking Point, U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 18, 2004, at
50.
5 50 U.S.C.A. § 413b(e) (2002).
6 Kibbe, supra note 2, at 104.
7 Id.
8 50 U.S.C.A. § 413b(e).
9 H.R. Rep. No. 102–166, at 29–30 (1991) (Conf. Rep.).
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are anticipated to involve United States military forces, meaning ap-
proval has been given by the National Command Authorities for the
activities and for operational planning for hostilities.10 Furthermore,
it was intended for traditional military activities also to include hostili-
ties that involve United States military forces in an ongoing manner,
where their role in the overall operation is apparent or is to be ac-
knowledged publicly.11
Under Title 50 of the United States Code, the President may not
authorize a covert action without ªrst determining in a written ªnding
that the action has an identiªable foreign policy or national security
objective for the United States.12 Moreover, the President must specify
each department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any signiªcant way in
such action.13 This statutory authorization for the President demon-
strates that Title 50 leaves the President wide latitude to select any
agency to carry out a covert mission, including the military.14
But in order to execute a truly covert paramilitary operation—
one where a premium is placed on the ability of the United States to
remove its identity as sponsor—the selection of the CIA to execute
the task may be, and traditionally has been, the logical choice because
its paramilitary operatives are trained to accept as part of their mis-
sions that they operate without protection or help from the United
States government.15 If an authorized covert action run by the CIA is
compromised, the United States can still maintain plausible deniabil-
ity based on this understanding among CIA operatives.16 This lack of
acknowledged status nulliªes any concern under international law as
to an operative’s loss of international protections for operating with-
out any identiªable afªliation with the United States.17 Furthermore,
since the covert activity is being conducted without any relation back
to the United States as sponsor, CIA covert paramilitary operations
may run counter to international law or the local laws of the country
                                                                                                                     
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 50 U.S.C.A. § 413b(a) (2002).
13 Id.
14 Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Opera-
tions Forces After Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Weekly Standard, Jan. 26, 2004, at 29.
15 Kathryn Stone, “All Necessary Means” Employing CIA Operatives in a Warªghting Role
Alongside Special Operations Forces, U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project,
Apr. 7, 2003, at 13, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/stone.pdf.
16 See id.
17 See Kibbe, supra note 2, at 113.
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in which the activity is taking place.18 Covert operations under Title 50
must comply at the very least with the laws of the United States.19
There is no statutory mandate, however, that binds the agency se-
lected by the President to conduct a covert operation in accordance
with international law.20 With respect to the laws of foreign states,
covert operations do not assume the superiority of United States law
over that of a foreign country.21 Rather, they assert that there are
overriding national interests that have to be dealt with outside the
framework of international law and normal state-to-state relations,
without resort to the use of ofªcial military force.22 This implies that
the United States is prepared to take direct steps to protect its con-
cerns in a world where not all countries have respect for its interests
or the norms of international society.23
In support of its plan to engage Special Operations Forces in
covert paramilitary operations, the Defense Department has cited the
greater size and availability of these forces to respond to an undenia-
bly global enemy.24 Special Forces operatives are the most elite per-
sonnel of the United States military and their exposure to the mili-
tary’s most advanced training and equipment makes them more
experienced and more educated than the rest of the conventional
armed forces.25 These operatives engage in specialized missions that
include unconventional warfare, strategic reconnaissance, direct ac-
tion, and counterterrorism.26 The Defense Department thus contends
that the combined Special Forces units, comprising tens of thousands
of elite commandoes, may be better equipped to respond to numer-
ous simultaneous threats around the world than the CIA’s few hun-
dred paramilitary ofªcers.27 While the CIA possesses expertise in es-
pionage and intelligence analysis and has engaged in covert para-
military activity, the belief is held that small, highly mobile Special
                                                                                                                     
18 See Stone, supra note 15, at 15.
19 50 U.S.C.A. § 413b(a)(5) (2002).
20 See Stone, supra note 15, at 15.
21 See Richard A. Best, Jr., Cong. Research Serv., Intelligence and Law En-
forcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. 27 (2001).
22 Id.
23 See id. at 27–28.
24 See Robinson, supra note 4, at 50.
25 Matthew B. Stannard, Special Forces Have Scoped Iraq for Weeks: Unconventional Troops
Expert at Covert Reconnaissance, San Fran. Chronicle, Mar. 21, 2003, at W10.
26 10 U.S.C.A. § 167(j) (1994).
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Operations forces may be well suited to attack the new threats in light
of their own proven areas of expertise.28
The Defense Department has taken the position that the United
States is in an active war and therefore any military activity, including
Special Forces, would qualify as a traditional military activity that does
not require a Presidential ªnding.29 The United States is relying on its
inherent right of self-defense to justify the use of military force against
terrorists.30 Senate Joint Resolution 23, which granted the use of force
in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, authorized the
President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those na-
tions, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organiza-
tions or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of inter-
national terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.31
This has led some legal scholars to contend that the Resolution grants
the President virtually unlimited authority to use military force in the
war on terror, as long as he “determines” that a particular target has
some connection to these attacks.32
In conjunction with this impression of the war on terror, the De-
fense Department increased the authority of Special Operations Com-
mand (SOCOM), the headquarters that controls all Special Forces
commando units.33 SOCOM authority was amended from a purely
“supporting command,” which can only contribute to other combatant
commands’ missions, into a “supported command,” which can plan
and execute its own independent operations if authorized by the Secre-
tary of Defense or the President.34 While few will deny that the new
threats posed by terrorism may call for updated and creative response
techniques, one cannot overlook the implications of these new rules on
                                                                                                                     
28 See Bruce Berkowitz, Fighting the New War, The Hoover Digest No. 3, 2002, at 46.
29 Jennifer D. Kibbe, A Loophole for Covert Operations, Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Aug.
8, 2004, at 5.
30 Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., International Law and Terrorism: Some “Qs
and As” for Operators, 2002 Army Law. 23, 24.
31 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codiªed as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 541 (2001)).
32 Kibbe, supra note 2, at 108.
33 Id. at 110.
34 Id.
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the Special Forces, especially where non-uniformed, covert operations
are involved.35
II. Discussion
Under the law of armed conºict, the United States military
would be bound to act not only in accordance with customary inter-
national law but also with any treaties and international agreements
concerning armed hostilities to which the United States is a party.36
Therefore, although the war on terror is not an international armed
conºict involving two or more nation-states, United States military
personnel engaged in the effort must adhere to the international laws
of war in the Geneva and Hague Conventions.37 This adherence varies
signiªcantly from the relative freedom from international constraints
with which the CIA can conduct the same operations.38
Regardless of the lack of a statutory mandate to conduct covert
operations in accordance with international law, the selection of for-
mal military personnel to execute such operations cannot be made
without invoking international rules.39 The use of formal military
force to conduct a covert military operation amounts to an act of war
in terms of international law.40 Furthermore, United States policy dic-
tates that the U.S. armed forces must “comply with the law of war dur-
ing all armed conºicts, however such conºicts are characterized, and
with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other opera-
tions.”41 Therefore, the mere introduction of formal United States
military personnel into an operation invokes under United States pol-
icy the international law of armed conºict that governs the conduct of
international armed hostilities.42
It follows that where United States military personnel are ex-
pected to adhere to international laws of war and the applicable trea-
ties of armed conºict, they also would expect the protections of those
same laws and treaties.43 Those who serve in the military accept their
responsibilities with the understanding that international rules gov-
                                                                                                                     
35 See Robinson, supra note 4, at 48.
36 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Directive No. 5100.77, ¶ 3.1 (Dec. 9, 1998).
37 Stone, supra note 15, at 16.
38 See Best, supra note 21, at 27.
39 See Dunlap, Jr., supra note 30, at 24.
40 Stone, supra note 15, at 11.
41 Directive No. 5100.77, supra note 36, ¶ 5.3.1.
42 See id.
43 See Kibbe, supra note 2, at 113.
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erning the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners will apply to
them should something go wrong, regardless of the nature of their
mission.44 This expectation does not harmonize with the concept of
plausible deniability inherent in covert operations.45 The United
States government, if it wishes to employ its formal military personnel
in covert operations, would encounter a situation it has never faced
were the operation to be compromised.46 Under the policy of strict
deniability surrounding covert operations, Special Forces covert op-
eratives could no longer expect to receive protection or help from the
United States government if captured, whereas traditional military
personnel, engaged in open military exercises, would continue to re-
ceive protection.47
In order to remove the imprint of United States sponsorship
from a covert action, Special Forces covert operatives would be re-
quired to forfeit their military identities and any other manifestation
of a relationship with the United States government.48 Because the
United States military is supposed to adhere to a policy of compliance
with the law of war during all armed conºicts, however, the use of
formal military personnel mandates a sharp distinction between civil-
ians and combatants.49 Neither the Global War on Terrorism nor the
fact that one is a member of the Special Operations Forces grants a
license for military personnel to wear anything other than the full,
standard uniform.50 Once United States military personnel begin to
conduct missions out of uniform, they lose the protections of the Ge-
neva conventions should they be captured.51
Furthermore, a United States military operative conducting a
covert mission without any identiªable afªliation with its sponsor may
be considered an illegal combatant by his captors.52 Although “illegal
combatant” is not mentioned anywhere in the Geneva Conventions, it
is a concept that has long been recognized by state practice in the law
                                                                                                                     
44 See id.
45 See Stone, supra note 15, at 11.
46 See id.
47 Id. at 13.
48 See id. at 12.
49 See John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 207, 216–17
(2003).
50 W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 493, 543
(2003).
51 Kibbe, supra note 2, at 113.
52 Stone, supra note 15, at 12.
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of war.53 Engaging United States military personnel in true covert ac-
tivity, devoid of any afªliation with the United States government, in
effect frees them from the control of a nation-state that would require
them to obey the laws of war.54 Such unafªliated, intentional con-
cealment of military personnel among the civilian population blurs
the line between civilians and combatants, and a captor may classify
this as unlawful activity.55
This anonymity and resultant classiªcation as an illegal combat-
ant could make the covert operative culpable for acts committed on
behalf of the United States.56 Illegal combatants enjoy no immunity
from prosecution for their military activities.57 Also, a United States
military operative engaged in a covert operation out of uniform is
susceptible to being liable for the deaths or injuries that result on ac-
count of his actions.58 Conversely, a uniformed United States military
operative engaged in action in accordance with the laws of war would
not be liable for any actions that comply with those laws.59
In addition to the speciªc international ramiªcations for Special
Forces personnel engaged in covert activity, their participation in such
acts can have heightened consequences on the United States in the in-
ternational political sphere.60 In general, covert action can have diplo-
matic repercussions since their nature may involve sending United
States agents into foreign countries against the full knowledge of the
local government.61 The discovery that the agents are military person-
nel could cause enormous policy problems for the U.S. Government,
whether the local government is an ally or an enemy.62 As a result, the
United States could jeopardize its trustworthiness and credibility in the
international community and hamper the willingness of the target
country to cooperate with its agenda.63
                                                                                                                     
53 Yoo & Ho, supra note 49, at 216.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 Stone, supra note 15, at 12.
57 Yoo & Ho, supra note 49, at 222.
58 W. Michael Reisman, Covert Action, Remarks at the International Studies Associa-
tion Annual Meeting, Intelligence Section, (March 29, 1994), in 20 Yale J. Int’l L. 419,
422 (1995).
59 See Dunlap, Jr., supra note 30, at 30.
60 Kibbe, supra note 2, at 104–05.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 105.
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III. Analysis
Those operations that call for covert activity may best be left in
the domain of the CIA, which operates with its own set of understand-
ings regarding international protection and governmental support.64
Yet the Defense Department’s desire to create a role for its most
highly trained warriors in the war on terror still should be encour-
aged under existing law.65 Under United States statute, the Special
Forces are authorized to conduct direct action when executing their
operations.66 Direct action entails the use of military force to achieve
limited objectives.67 Utilizing Special Forces operatives for direct ac-
tion responses against terrorist targets would allow the Defense De-
partment to achieve its objectives via swift and precise uses of force.68
Direct action, as a statutorily authorized activity of Special Forces
operatives, would provide greater justiªcation for the use of Special
Forces as a “traditional military activity.”69 This classiªcation as a “tra-
ditional military activity” would remove the need to obtain a Presiden-
tial ªnding, as is required for covert actions.70 As a result, this exemp-
tion, coupled with steps already taken such as the amended authority
of SOCOM as a “supported command,” would move the Defense De-
partment closer to the objectives it advocates.71
More importantly, use of direct action would mean that the United
States would openly use its Special Forces in uniform in action for
which it is not denying responsibility.72 Title 10 permits the use of Spe-
cial Forces to preempt terrorists or support resistance movements clan-
destinely, as long as the U.S. government does not deny involvement
when the mission is over.73 By executing traditional military activities in
uniform, Special Forces operatives would be called to comply with in-
ternational law and could expect its protections in accordance with the
international laws of war.74 Classiªcation of such action as traditional
                                                                                                                     
64 See Stone, supra note 15, at 13.
65 See Berkowitz, supra note 28, at 44–45.
66 10 U.S.C.A. § 167(j) (1994).
67 Berkowitz, supra note 28, at 45.
68 See Rumsfeld, supra note 3, at 27.
69 50 U.S.C.A. § 413b(e)(2) (2002).
70 Id. at § 413b(a).
71 See Robinson, supra note 4, at 49; Kibbe, supra note 2, at 108.
72 See Berkowitz, supra note 28, at 45.
73 See Shultz, Jr., supra note 14, at 30.
74 Stone, supra note 15, at 16.
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military activity would further the goal of the United States to imple-
ment all necessary and appropriate means of force at its disposal.75
It is likely that situations will arise that call for covert activity due
to the political sensitivity or elevated risk level surrounding the mis-
sion.76 Unless the United States intends to impose a waiver of interna-
tional protections upon Special Forces operatives called upon to con-
duct such operations, and deny their involvement if exposed, such a
mission would never be truly covert by deªnition.77 The loss of Ge-
neva Convention status for Special Forces operatives who operate out
of uniform seems a disproportionate burden to attach to a mission
that is only truly covert if performed successfully.78 With the legal ca-
pability of pursuing terror targets via direct action under Title 10, the
United States can extend its reach in the war on terror without com-
promising its Special Forces.79
Some Defense Department ofªcials argue that the loss of Geneva
Convention status may be moot when dealing with adversaries who do
not honor them.80 Al Qaeda, unafªliated with any nation state and a
sworn enemy of the United States, has never declared, and likely will
never declare, an intention to respect the Geneva Conventions.81 The
United States is dealing with an enemy whose tactics defy the core
principles of the laws of war through attacks on purely civilian targets
with the aim of inºicting massive civilian casualties.82 The expectation
of humane treatment of United States personnel in the event of cap-
ture seems more remote when our enemy recognizes that it will not
have prisoner of war status if captured by the United States.83
Nonetheless, it remains politically wiser for the United States mili-
tary to respect international law in the event its soldiers are captured by
                                                                                                                     
75 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codiªed as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 541 (2001)).
76 See Berkowitz, supra note 28, at 43.
77 Stone, supra note 15, at 13.
78 See Eric H. Singer, Book Note, 17 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 350, 362 (1994) (re-
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79 See Berkowitz, supra note 28, at 45.
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81 See Yoo & Ho, supra note 49, at 215–16.
82 Id. at 216.
83 See Bob Kemper & Naftali Bendavid, U.S. Grants POW Status to Taliban, Not Al-Qaeda,
Chi. Trib., Feb. 8, 2002, at 1.
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parties afªliated with a foreign state.84 Under such circumstances, the
U.S. military member would be entitled to prisoner of war status.85 In
addition, respecting international law through the use of the United
States military entails a sense of openness and responsibility that legiti-
mizes the goals of the United States in the war on terror.86 The use of
military personnel in uniform and insignia in the war on terror signals
a concomitant commitment by the United States to respect the laws of
war.87 Most importantly, utilizing our troops identiªably in open mili-
tary exercises aligns more readily with their expectation that they will
be protected by their government as they serve it.88
Conclusion
In June 2005, the White House rejected classiªed recommenda-
tions by a presidential commission that would have given the Penta-
gon greater authority to conduct covert action.89 Despite the lack of a
wholesale transfer of covert operations to the Department of Defense,
the President already has signed a series of ªndings and executive or-
ders authorizing secret commando groups and other Special Forces
units to conduct covert operations against suspected terrorist targets
in as many as ten nations in the Middle East and South Asia.90 The
war on terrorism requires swift and effective response measures to
combat an enemy who is mobile and unremitting. In confronting this
modern and unpredictable threat, the United States should apply all
necessary and appropriate resources to eradicate the enemy.
The proposal by the Defense Department to utilize United States
Special Forces operatives in combating terrorism should be encour-
aged in terms of direct military action to be conducted in uniform as
a traditional military activity. Authorizing military activity in such a
manner invokes international rules of war and the protections they
tender. Covert operations that require operatives to abandon all ties
to the United States should remain with the CIA due to the prospect
that such operations may violate international law and, if compro-
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mised, result in no international protections. CIA operatives accept
this possibility when they accept their missions. With the ability to
employ the Special Forces in a larger capacity in the war on terror
under existing law, the risks they stand to face under international law
during covert operations appear not to warrant their involvement in
this respect. Special Operations Forces should engage in open, uni-
formed missions authorized through their command chain, and their
training and expertise will enable the execution of operationally sen-
sitive missions in accordance with international law.
